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THE CONSTITUTION OUTSIDE THE COURTS—THE CASE FOR PARLIAMENTARY 




Abstract: This article makes the case for greater parliamentary involvement over assessments 
of the compliance of policy proposals with constitutional commitments. It proceeds in four 
parts. Part I outlines the strongest normative justifications for parliamentary involvement in 
pre-enactment constitutional review in theoretical ideal-type accounts offered by scholars. Part 
II outlines the Irish constitutional review process. It traces the predominant role played by the 
executive and judiciary, and how Parliament is largely excluded from any substantive 
participation. Part III provides a comparative account of how several other common-law 
parliamentary systems implement parliamentary engagement with rights issues. Part IV distils 
the various factors considered in Part III by way of guiding potential institutional reforms 
aimed at facilitating a more pronounced role for Parliament over constitutional review. It is 
tentatively suggested that the recent innovation of pre-legislative scrutiny—if accompanied by 
several additional initiatives—may serve as a good basis for commencing any conversation 
concerning reform. These amendments include reforming the extremely secretive and opaque 
process of executive branch legal review, and promoting greater parliamentary capacity to 
contest and scrutinise executive determinations through the creation of a non-partisan, 
specialised and well-resourced constitutional law committee. However, Part V concludes on a 
note of caution and highlights the obvious barriers which may hamper attempts at cultivating 
greater parliamentary involvement over constitutional review, notwithstanding any reforms. 
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 2 
INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE 
 
Executive dominance over policy formation and law-making in Ireland has been well 
documented. The constitution vests the Oireachtas with a great deal of power—the “sole and 
exclusive power of making laws” for the State. However, it is widely understood that the 
executive is in fact the most powerful branch of state,2 exercising considerable authority over 
the law-making process.3 A considerable body of academic scholarship has grown exploring 
and explaining this trend. These accounts present the executive’s predominance as a 
consequence of several factors; including Ireland’s Westminster form of government,4 the 
centrality of cohesive organised political parties to allocations of public power,5 and the rise of 
the modern administrative state.6 In addition to identifying and exploring factors which 
compound executive dominance, Irish public law and political science scholarship have also 
explored institutional reforms that might strengthen the position of the Oireachtas in 
performing its core functions:7 including holding the executive to account and discharging its 
role as the exclusive law-maker of the State by engaging with, deliberating on, and robustly 
scrutinising policy proposals. There are now debates over the current extent of executive 
predominance8 and the degree to which it has fluctuated during Ireland’s ongoing experience 
of minority government and recent modest parliamentary reform.9 However, the fact that the 
 
2 If we understand power in this context as referring to the ability to “control the outcomes of contested decision 
making processes and secure their preferred policies” or “the ability to effect substantive policy outcomes by 
influencing what the government will or will not do”. Daryl J. Levinson, “Foreword: Looking for Power in Public 
Law” (2016) 130 Harvard Law Review 1 at 33. 
3 Conor Casey, “Under-explored Corners: Inherent Executive Power in the Irish Constitutional Order” (2017) 
40(1) Dublin University Law Journal 1; Lia O’Hegarty, “The Constitutional Parameters of the Work of the Houses 
of the Oireachtas”, in Manning and MacCarthaigh (eds), The Houses of the Oireachtas: Parliament in Ireland 
(Institute of Public Administration, 2010), p.103. 
4 Alan J. Ward, The Irish Constitutional Tradition: Responsible Government and Modern Ireland 1782–1992, 
(Irish Academic Press, 1994), p.157. 
5 Muris MacCarthaigh, “The Role of the Houses of the Oirechatas: Theory and Practice”, in Manning and 
MacCarthaigh (eds) (2010) fn.3 above, p.48. 
6 Eoin Carolan, The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State (Oxford University Press, 2009).  
7 See for example Eoin Daly and Tom Hickey, The Political Theory of the Irish Constitution: Republicanism and 
the Basic Law (Manchester University Press, 2015), p.99. 
8 Eoin O’Malley, “The Apex of Government: Cabinet and Taoiseach in Operation”, in O’Malley and 
MacCarthaigh, Governing Ireland: From Cabinet Government to Delegated Governance (Institute of Public 
Administration, 2012), p.37. 
9 For example, a recent article authored by several Irish political scientists assessing the impact of pre-legislative 
scrutiny and several other recent political reforms has suggested that: “The reforms made in the thirty-first and 
thirty-second Dáil Éireann represent the most substantial changes to the operation of the Dáil since it was formed. 
These changes shift Ireland substantially on the scale of government control of the parliament … In particular, 
the election of the Ceann Comhairle by secret ballot, the creation of the Business Committee, pre-legislative 
scrutiny and the allocation of committee chairs on the basis of proportionality can strengthen the parliament.” 
Catherine Lynch, Eoin O’Malley, Theresa Reidy, David M. Farrell, Jane Suiter, “Dáil reforms since 2011: 
Pathway to power for the 'puny' parliament?” (2017) 65 Administration 37 at 55. 
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executive generally exercises considerable control over Parliament is not contested, even if it 
is recognised that this control exists on a continuum.  
 Despite the considerable array of literature discussing executive–parliamentary 
relations, and the appropriate calibration of power between the two, there is one related and 
important issue that has received scant consideration: the absence of any substantive or 
structured role for Parliament to contest and debate specifically over constitutional issues 
during the legislative process.  
 The judiciary is not the only institution capable of assessing the compatibility of 
legislation with constitutional or statutory rights-based commitments. In many legal systems, 
this process encompasses the political branches playing an important role through engaging in 
pre-enactment constitutional/political review.10 Accounts offered in public law scholarship 
argue that pre-enactment review by both political branches promotes several valuable 
normative benefits, including enhancing government accountability by subjecting its decisions 
to constitutional or rights-based scrutiny internally through executive assessment, and then 
externally through parliamentary and public scrutiny. This in turn is said to encourage the 
political branches to be more rights-conscious in their approach to the law-making process and 
the public to be more aware of rights issues. Similarly, proponents of political-branch review 
argue that it represents a more compelling way to cohere democratic self-governance with 
constitutional or rights commitments, than relying on judicial review alone. 
 In Ireland, however, the constitutional review process is dominated by the executive 
and judiciary and disempowers Parliament from any meaningful say over questions concerning 
constitutional commitments. Although Ireland has a form of pre-enactment review, it is a 
highly secretive process heavily dominated by the executive. It is a variant far removed from 
the ideal-type outlined in theoretical accounts. Consequently, it instantiates few of the benefits 
typically associated with pre-enactment review. Aiming to compensate for a dearth of literature 
on this issue, this article makes the case for greater parliamentary involvement in questions 
concerning the compliance of policy proposals with constitutional commitments. 
 This article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the strongest normative justifications 
for parliamentary involvement in pre-enactment constitutional review in theoretical accounts 
offered by scholars. Part II outlines the Irish constitutional review process. It traces the 
predominant role played by the executive and judiciary, and how Parliament is largely excluded 
 
10 Janet L. Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model” (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 7. 
These terms are interchangeable, depending on whether the legal system in question has a constitutional or 
statutory bill of rights.  
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from any substantive participation. Part III gives a comparative account of how several other 
common-law parliamentary systems implement pre-enactment review and parliamentary 
engagement with rights issues, focusing on Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. I 
suggest that attempts to realise the benefits associated with ideal-type theoretical accounts have 
had modest success at best. This is because the efficacy of pre-enactment review at promoting 
them appears contingent on the wider political surround of the system pre-enactment review is 
embedded.11 Thus, political party cohesiveness and the institutional closeness between 
Parliament and the executive12 have impacted realisation of these benefits. However, the form 
and structure pre-enactment review itself takes also has an impact on efficacy. Systems where 
the process is executive-dominated and opaque appear to veer further from the benefits of the 
ideal-type. In contrast, where the structure of pre-enactment review is more transparent, and 
carves out institutional space for Parliament to scrutinise and contest executive decisions, it 
offers a closer approximation to theoretical accounts. Overall, pre-enactment review in these 
systems generally represents a sub-optimal approximation of the account of political review 
offered by theorists.13 That said, though few systems match the ideal-type account, a more 
transparent form of pre-enactment review with a greater structured role for Parliament can 
nonetheless retain important benefits that the Irish system could similarly gain. Part IV distils 
the factors analysed in Part III to consider potential institutional reforms aimed at facilitating a 
more pronounced role for Parliament over constitutional review. I suggest the recent innovation 
of pre-legislative scrutiny—if accompanied by several additional initiatives—may serve as a 
good starting basis for any conversation concerning reform. These amendments include 
reforming the extremely secretive and opaque process of executive branch legal review, and 
promoting greater parliamentary capacity to contest and scrutinise executive determinations 
through creation of a non-partisan, specialised and well-resourced constitutional law 
committee. However, Part V concludes on a note of caution and highlights the obvious barriers 
which may hamper attempts at cultivating greater parliamentary involvement over 
constitutional review, notwithstanding any reforms, the most prominent being the difficulty 
inherent in creating and sustaining a culture of parliamentary constitutional review in a context 
 
11 The term “political surround” to refer to the broad array of actors acting within and around the branches formally 
identified in the Constitution order, including political parties, party whips, party activists, special advisors, civil 
servants, special-interest groups and lobbyists. See Aziz Huq and Jon D. Michaels, “The Cycles of Separation-of-
Powers Jurisprudence” (2016) 125 Yale Law Journal 346. 
12 Janet L. Hiebert and James B. Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: The Experience of New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom (Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp.401–402. 
13 Rosalind Dixon, “The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review” (2017) 38 Cardozo Law Review 2193 at 
2230. 
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where strong-form judicial review is strongly institutionalised and entrenched. It may be 
extremely difficult to determine in the abstract whether the kind of reforms I am advocating 
will be capable of morphing broader constitutional culture. 
 
 
I. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR PARLIAMENTARY INVOLVEMENT IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
 
Pre-enactment constitutional review involves the political branches of government—the 
executive and legislative branch—assessing the compliance of legislative proposals with 
fundamental constitutional commitments.14 The account of pre-enactment review promoted by 
scholars is associated with a diverse range of benefits. These include greater rights 
consciousness amongst the political branches in the law-making process—facilitated by fuller, 
freer and more transparent engagement and deliberation over rights and values by the 
executive, Parliament and the public. This is secured by a combination of internal executive 
review, and subsequent parliamentary and public engagement and scrutiny of the executive’s 
initial assessment. In turn, this fuller and more open debate on constitutional issues may also 
counteract the limitations of relying on judicial review to vindicate constitutional or statutory 
rights-based commitments. This account of pre-enactment review is said to offer the 
institutional means to mediate a more optimal form of constitutionalism; one that provides a 
better mediation between democratic self-governance and constitutionalism, the dual concepts 
underlying constitutional democracy.15 
 
 
(a) Fosters greater rights-consciousness over decisions implicating rights  
 
Scholars such as Gardbaum and Hiebert argue that pre-enactment review helps ensure the 
political branches think and act in a more rights-conscious way when considering policy 
proposals.16 Pre-enactment review achieves this by dispersing responsibility for rights review 
amongst all the branches of government; meaning that ensuring compatibility of policies with 
 
14 See Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights”, fn.10 above. 
15 Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), p.52. 
16 Footnote 15, pp.77–82. See Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights”, fn.10. 
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constitutional commitments is a task for the executive and legislature, and not just the courts. 
Political review places the onus on government to give effect to rights principles when 
developing legislation, encouraged by scrutiny by Parliament and the public.17 Dispersal of this 
responsibility is additionally said to provide more robust protection for rights, given courts can 
typically check only small segments of legislative activity through litigation.18 
 
 
(b) Avoids limitations of relying on judicial review alone 
 
Pre-enactment review also allows for a greater airing of diverse viewpoints and perspectives 
on constitutional issues than relying on judicial reasoning alone.19 Those critical of strong legal 
constitutionalism20 contend that courts tend to confront morally and politically infused 
constitutional issues in narrow legalistic terms, in a manner where engagement with relevant 
and pressing moral considerations is almost wholly ignored.21 For those more supportive of 
political constitutionalism, the kind of issues addressed by constitutional courts are too vital 
for ultimate decisions about them to be at the mercy of legalistic “theories of interpretation or 
the labored concoction of analogies” which might wash out relevant moral and political 
considerations.22 
 Unlike a court, which is constrained to addressing the factual matrix of a case before it, 
arguments made by counsel and perhaps extensive prior precedent, when the political branches 
address important rights issues through pre-enactment review, they are better placed to 
deliberate upon moral and political matters more directly. Given that answers to questions 
 
17 Janet Hiebert, “Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role?’ (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), p.4. 
18 Janet L. Hiebert, “New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance When 
Interpreting Rights?” (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1963 at 1986.  
19 Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346 at 1381. 
20 Tom Hickey provides a useful summary: “Although a broad school, legal constitutionalist scholars tend to 
present law as a distinctive enterprise to politics, and, indeed, as a higher, more principled, vocation. They suppose 
that law serves to contain and control politics, through the enforcement of certain principles of legality and 
fundamental rights. Very often, those principles and rights are understood as pre-determined and mechanically 
identifiable. That is, that the job of judges is to set out the meaning and implications of a set of pre-existing, pre-
political rights and to apply them against political actors, thereby upholding an essentially legally-defined 
framework within which ordinary politics can occur.” Tom Hickey, “Judges as God’s philosophers? Re-thinking 
‘principle’ in constitutional adjudication”, in Cahillane, Gallen and Hickey (eds), Judges, Politics and the Irish 
Constitution (Manchester University Press, 2016), p.65. 
21 Richard H. Fallon, “The Core Of An Uneasy Case For Judicial Review” (2008) 121 Harvard Law Review 1693 
at 1698; Gordon Silverstein, Law’s Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves and Kills Politics (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p.63. 
22 Jeremy Waldron, “Judges as Moral Reasoners” (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 2 at 23. 
See also Keith Whittington, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses” (2002) 
80 North Carolina Law Review 773 at 813. 
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concerning constitutional rights involve a host of thorny considerations inviting reasonable 
disagreement,23 proponents of pre-enactment review suggest it makes little sense to pretend 
judges have superior or exclusive insights, particularly when judges tend to rely on the typical 
tool-kit of judicial reasoning.24 
 
(c) Facilitates popular engagement with shaping constitutional commitments 
 
Relatedly, political review is said to provide a better means of cohering democratic self-
governance with constitutional commitments than relying on judicial review alone.25 It does so 
by providing scope for greater popular engagement with shaping the content of constitutional 
commitments, rather than reserving this function to a relatively homogeneous band of judges 
and elite lawyers. Greater political branch engagement in the constitutional review process 
allows elected representatives to bring a greater diversity of views to bear on rights 
deliberations compared to the “numerically smaller, cloistered and elite world of the higher 
judiciary”.26 Proponents of political constitutionalism who propose this engagement may 
disrupt the notion that constitutional argument is a body of technical expert knowledge, or a 
rarefied activity that only those with formal legal training can participate in and shape.27  
 This view proceeds on the premise that constitutional interpretation is not a process 
capable of determination by disinterested, neutral or mechanical application of authoritative 
legal sources such as judicial precedent or text. Rather, it involves complex moral and political 
questions about the content and scope of rights, the boundaries of governmental powers, and a 
conception of how our society works and what values are most important to it.28 Thus, it is 
inevitable that moral and political viewpoints, shaped by a person’s background and life 
experience, will shape their bona fide view on what the “Constitution is for, and what the 
 
23 For example, whether the importance of the values the legislation seeks to advance are legitimate and justified 
in the interests of the common good, or whether the means are proportionate to the ends. 
24 Hiebert, “New Constitutional Ideas”, fn.18, at 1987; Mark Tushnet, “How Different are Waldron’s and Fallon’s 
Core Cases For and Against Judicial Review?” (2010) 30 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 49 at 51–52. 
25 See Eoin Daly, “Reappraising judicial supremacy in the Irish constitutional tradition”, in Hickey, Callihane and 
Gallen (eds), Judges, Politics and the Irish Constitution (Manchester University Press, 2017), p.35; See also 
Wojciech Sadurski, Rights before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Springer, 2005), p.115. 
26 Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model, fn.15, p.69.  
27 Daly, “Reappraising judicial supremacy”, fn.25; Whittington, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation”, 
fn.22 at 818. 
28 See David Kenny, “Merit, diversity, and interpretive communities: the (non-party) politics of judicial 
appointments”, in Callihane, Gallen and Hickey (eds), Judges, Politics and the Irish Constitution (Manchester 
University Press, 2017). 
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Constitution means”.29 Voters and their representatives may come to conscientious conclusions 
about the constitution’s meaning that differ from those reached by constitutional courts.30 
However, proponents of this view argue that this does not mean these differing views are 
wrong, but only that they are different given that the meaning of indeterminate constitutional 
text will often lie within a range of reasonable disagreement.31 Irish judges already reach 
different, often strongly opposed, conclusions in the same case. This fact is reflective of the 
kinds of principled disagreement over vaguely worded constitutional rights and aspirations 
which will invariably exist across broader society.32 There appears to be no pressing reason 
why Parliament should not be able to add its bona fide voice to this kind of principled 
discourse.33 This suggestion may be controversial to those who prize finality in 
constitutionalism and who associate judicial supremacy over constitutional interpretation as 
the only feasible means to achieve it.34 It will be less so for those sympathetic to 
departmentalism35 and extrajudicial interpretation, who value open deliberation over the 
“relative interpretive openness of the Constitution as a positive good rather than an unnecessary 
evil”.36 The Irish Constitution explicitly provides for strong-form judicial review.37 However, 
this argument is not necessarily incompatible with maintaining robust judicial review to nullify 
state action that clearly violates constitutional commitments. Instead, it poses a challenge to 
the notion that courts enjoy exclusive authority to determine constitutional meaning. It also 
raises the difficult question whether the court’s interpretation of the Constitution should always 
predominate when the political branches act on an alternative but bona fide and reasonable 
constitutional interpretation.38  
 
 
(d) Limitations of relying on executive review alone 
 
29 Kenny, “Merit, diversity, and interpretive communities”, fn.28, p.136. 
30 Mark Tushnet, Advanced Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), 
p.46.  
31 Tushnet, Advanced Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law, fn.30. 
32 Hickey, “Re-thinking ‘principle’ in constitutional adjudication”, fn.20. 
33 Whittington, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation”, fn.22 at 813. 
34 I take judicial supremacy in this context to mean the view that superior court interpretations of the constitution 
should be taken by all “officials, judicial and non-judicial, as having an authoritative status equivalent to the 
Constitution itself”. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schaeur, “Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply”, (2000) 17 
Constitutional Commentary 455. 
35 Broadly speaking, departmentalism can be taken to mean that each branch has co-equal authority to interpret 
the constitution in the context of conducting its respective duties and that no branch should dominate as a matter 
of course. Whittington, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation”, fn.22 at 783. 
36 Whittington, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation”, fn.22 at 813. 
37 See Art.26 and Art.34 of the Irish Constitution. 
38 Whittington, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation”, fn.22 at 831. 
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So much for the limitations associated with relying solely on judicial reasoning. However, a 
further question arises. Why it is important Parliament takes an increased role during 
constitutional review? In other words, why is it not sufficient to allow the executive to have 
sole say at the pre-enactment stage, and then leave it to the judiciary to scrutinise their 
conclusions post-enactment? After all, the executive is also a representative branch of 
government. It enjoys a democratic mandate; appointed by a popularly elected Parliament to 
which it remains answerable. Why should they not be trusted to reach good-faith conclusions 
on the Constitution free from parliamentary scrutiny? 
 The objection to leaving pre-enactment review with the executive alone stems from the 
fact that disputes concerning constitutional rights and values are tied up with moral and 
political considerations; issues which invariably invite reasonable differences of opinion. If the 
possibility of reasonable differences justifies doubt that judges have the only relevant opinions 
on how to reconcile conflicting rights and values, then similarly strong doubts should arise 
from relying exclusively on the judgment of a few executive lawyers. This is particularly the 
case if the review is carried out in a closed secretive process. No matter how conscientious the 
internal review process, relying on executive assessment alone at the pre-enactment stage 
involves crucially important constitutional judgments—decisions about the State’s 
fundamental law—being made by a handful of lawyers within an opaque process effectively 
immune from any real external scrutiny.39 Closing out Parliament has the dramatic effect of 
narrowing meaningful public engagement and scrutiny over the assumptions and reasons 
underlying assertions of compatibility.40 For example, whether conclusions are based on 
assumptions stemming from an overly conservative or lax interpretation of the Constitution. 
Or whether an executive determination on constitutionality stems from a lax or conservative 
reaction to legal advice provided by the Attorney-General. Simply put, in a secretive executive-
dominated process, Parliament and the public cannot scrutinise what they cannot see. Left 
solely in the hands of executive lawyers in a process closed off and aloof from politics, the 
“potentially distinctive democratic voice” offered by parliamentary input is muted. As is the 
possibility of free and full debate between the political branches and the public, which dilutes 
the vitality and legitimacy attributed to extrajudicial constitutionalism.41 
 
39 Hiebert, “Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role?”, fn.17, p.15. 
40 Hiebert, “Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role?”, fn.17, p.15. 
41 Cornellia T. Pillard, “The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands” (2005) 103 Michigan 
Law Review 676 at 743. 
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 In contrast, when the legislature has an institutional role over scrutinising executive 
determinations of constitutionality, this can provide clarity concerning the actual legal position 
of the executive. This in turn facilitates more nuanced engagement with these determinations 
by parliamentarians and civil society.42 Interpretations which, when exposed to the light of day, 
are politically, legally or morally objectionable can come under greater scrutiny. Without 
parliamentary engagement with executive determinations of constitutionality, benefits 
provided by pre-enactment review vis-à-vis enhancing scrutiny and transparency over 
decisions implicating constitutional commitments are severely diminished. Similarly, attempts 
to facilitate fuller and freer debate on important political and moral issues infusing 
constitutional review will also be weakened.  
 The next part of this article outlines the Irish constitutional review process and how 
parliament is largely excluded from any substantive participation, making its form of pre-
enactment review a poor variant of the ideal type account sketched above. 
 
 
II. PRE-ENACTMENT CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN IRELAND 
 
(a) Role of executive legal review 
 
The Constitution provides that the Attorney General (AG) is “the adviser of the Government 
in matters of law and legal opinion”.43 The AG has a close relationship with the Government, 
sitting in Cabinet meetings and appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the Taoiseach.44 
The AG is usually an eminent lawyer who was a member of, or has some political affiliation 
with, one of the parties in government. The AG acts a centralised provider of legal advice for 
the Cabinet, government departments, and core state agencies, on all areas of law.45 Any policy 
proposal generated by Government begins with consultation by the relevant Minister or 
department and the Taoiseach’s office and Department of Finance.46 Additionally, should the 
policy contain “any substantive constitutional or legal dimension”, the Attorney General’s 
 
42 Daphna Renan, “The Law Presidents Make” (2017) 103 Virginia Law Review 805 at 901. 
43 See Constitution of Ireland, Art.30.1 and 30.4 (1937). This is essentially the only constitutional basis for the 
AG’s role in pre-enactment review. 
44 He or she is formally appointed by the President, but the nomination is made by the Government, and the 
President has no discretion to refuse to make the appointment.  
45 For more detailed discussion of the AG’s role, see James Casey, The Irish Law Officers (Round Hall, 1996), 
p.53; David Kenny and Conor Casey, “Shadow Constitutional Review: The Dark Side of Pre-Enactment Political 
Review in Ireland and Japan”, International Journal of Constitutional Law (forthcoming, 2019). 
46 Department of the Taoiseach, Cabinet Handbook (2006) 32. 
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Office must be consulted as well.47 Any proposal that would lead to legislation must undergo 
prior consultation with the AG.48 
 If full legal advice is required, this should be acquired and taken into account before a 
memo is circulated to Government. If this advice is not obtained, any policy proposal to 
Government may be withdrawn by the Taoiseach.49 The AG is thus intimately involved in the 
formulation of policy and legislation. The Office remains involved in an advisory capacity 
throughout the formulation of policy and the drafting and passage of legislation by 
Government. Based on the AG’s advice, the Government will make decisions about what 
policies and enactments to pursue. It is only when the AG is satisfied as to the constitutionality 
of a policy and draft heads of bill that the relevant Minister will present the draft to Cabinet for 
agreement in order to introduce it to the Oireachtas. On controversial issues as diverse as 
abortion,50 gay-marriage51 and aggressive measures to tackle homelessness,52 the Government 
has explicitly relied on the AG’s advice as its justification for not taking legislative action.53 
 When advice is requested, a permanent advisory counsel (overseen generally by a 
senior member of the advisory counsel staff) researches the constitutional issues raised and 
helps the AG in preparation of advice.54 Any matter that is “legally significant or novel, 
politically important, sensitive or financially valuable”55 must be brought directly to the 
attention of the AG. Each government department may also have its own in-house legal adviser 
who may have an input. It is also common for additional legal advice to be sought from 
independent private practitioner barristers selected from specialist panels approved by the 
 
47 Cabinet Handbook, fn.46, p.32. 
48 Cabinet Handbook, fn.46, p.36.  
49 Cabinet Handbook, fn.46, p.32. 
50 A relatively recent and high-profile example of the executive’s refusal to publish legal advice on a deeply 
contested constitutional issue came with the defeat of Independent TD Clare Daly’s Bill allowing for abortion in 
cases of fatal foetal abnormality. Resisting opposition calls to disclose the legal basis for the Government’s 
opposition to the Bill, the Irish Times reported that Taoiseach Enda Kenny “ruled out accepting the legislation, 
having received an opinion from Attorney General Máire Whelan that it was unconstitutional. He said the AG’s 
advice would not be published, in line with precedent”. Michael O’Regan, “Government defeats Daly’s abortion 
Bill with big majority”, Irish Times, 10 February 2015. 
51 In 2006 the issue of same-sex marriage was gaining traction. In response to calls for legislative reform, the 
Minister for Justice said that the Government could not legislate for same-sex marriage as the advice of the AG 
was that any such legislation would be unconstitutional and a constitutional referendum would be required. 
Katherine Zappone, “In Pursuit of Marriage Equality in Ireland: A Narrative and Theoretical Reflection” (2013) 
10 The Equal Rights Review 115. 
52 Kitty Holland, “Kelly says Constitution blocked attempts to tackle housing crisis”, Irish Times, 3 March 2016.  
53 Oran Doyle, The Constitution of Ireland: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2018), pp.93–94. For a more 
detailed account of this phenomenon, see Kenny and Casey, “Shadow Constitutional Review”, fn.45. 
54 Office of the Attorney General, (2006) Annual Report, p.8. 
55 Office of the Attorney General, (2006) Annual Report, p.21. 
 12 
AG.56 There does not appear to be any set form for how AG’s advice is presented. Sometimes, 
advice will be incorporated into a policy memo or proposal that comes before Cabinet. With 
major and specific constitutional issues, the AG may prepare a formal memorandum of advice 
for Cabinet.57 
 The executive exercises extremely high levels of informational control over the AG’s 
advice. The advice of the AG is very rarely published, and detailed reasoning or even a 
summary of the written advice is generally not released for parliamentarians to scrutinise.58 
Moreover, it is unclear what substantive norms the AG applies when assessing 
constitutionality. 
 Publication of the legal basis for assertions of compliance or non-compliance would 
open avenues for review of controversial government policies; particularly those explicitly tied 
to contestable constitutional assessments of the AG. When an opinion is made public it can 
certainly help to defend an executive policy. It may be that no real constitutional issue arises 
on any reasonable interpretation, or the analysis given by the AG and endorsed by the executive 
is compelling. However, disclosure can also create controversy, and put the preferred policies 
at risk if the constitutional assessment is more contestable, as many constitutional issues are.59 
Near blanket insistence on non-disclosure of legal advice on constitutional compliance or non-
compliance narrows the scope for parliamentary or public scrutiny. It is currently extremely 
difficult for parliamentary deputies to scrutinise or contest the executive’s determination of 
constitutionality. They simply cannot assess or consider the basis on which the executive 
reaches its conclusions. Under Ireland’s current form of pre-enactment review, conclusions on 
the constitutional compliance of a bill are effectively presented to parliament as a fait 
accompli.60 As Hickey starkly puts it, once “one unelected lawyer has given an opinion on the 
 
56 In 2014 the Irish Times reported that: “The State is by far the biggest buyer of barristers’ services. Every day 
of the week, it turns to the law library for legal advice and dispatches counsel to represent it in civil and criminal 
cases in courthouses across the country, on everything from constitutional challenges to complaints against 
Government agencies.” Ruadhán Mac Cormaic, “Not unusual for some barristers to make €500,000 from AG’s 
office”, 7 January 2014. 
57 Casey (1996), fn.45, pp.110–112. 
58 Kenny and Casey, “Shadow Constitutional Review”, fn.45. In a very rare occurrence, in January 2018, a 
summary of the AG’s advice on the constitutional effects of removing or replacing Ireland’s constitutional 
prohibition on abortion was released by the Government. “Full text of Attorney General’s advice on repeal of 
Eighth Amendment”, Irish Times, 30 January 2018. 
59 Renan, “The Law Presidents Make”, fn.42 at 852. 
60 Conor O’Mahony, “Societal Change and Constitutional Interpretation” (2010) 1 Irish Journal of Legal Studies 
71 at 93. 
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(b) Role of judiciary 
 
The relationship between the executive and the judiciary in respect of constitutional issues is 
one of uncritical anticipatory obedience.62 It is extremely unlikely that the executive will 
consciously propose a piece of legislation anchored on a good faith, but possibly contrary 
understanding of a constitutional norm to that articulated by the courts.63 Disputes over the 
scope and substance of constitutional norms are not typically regarded as contestable in the 
context of public and parliamentary discourse. Instead, constitutional norms as enunciated by 
the judiciary are generally perceived as trump cards and a “technical-legal and essentially non-
political matter”.64 To be sure, there is certainly disagreement among politicians, academics 
and the media, often vociferous, over decisions made by the courts concerning constitutional 
issues. But judicial supremacy over authoritative constitutional interpretation per se has never 
faced any real challenge. Uncritical acceptance of judicial supremacy over constitutional 
interpretation has also ensured that government officials regard judicial decisions as binding 
not only in specific cases. They are also considered indicative of correct constitutional 
principles that may apply in a wide variety of future, not-yet-contemplated cases.65 When the 
courts speak to constitutional meaning in a case, questions may remain about the broader 
implications of the judgment—for example, whether a precedent may have lateral application 
in an analogous or different doctrinal arena.66 Decisions on its implications ultimately involve 
some executive interpretation.67 However, in the Irish legal order this will be heavily 
circumscribed by attempts to map how the judiciary are likely to rule in a future case. Executive 
interpretation will rarely involve the executive’s own bona fide and reasonable, but contrary, 
articulation of constitutional meaning. The concept of judicial supremacy over interpretation 
 
61 Tom Hickey, “Revisiting Ryan v Lennon to Make the Case Against Judicial Supremacy (And For a New Model 
of Constitutionalism in Ireland)” (2015) 53 Irish Jurist 125 at 147. 
62 Daly, “Reappraising judicial supremacy”, fn.25, p.12. 
63 However, given the intense secrecy surrounding the AG’s advice, this is impossible to conclusively confirm. 
64 Daly, “Reappraising judicial supremacy”, fn.25, p.12. 
65 Whittington, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation”, fn.22 at 845. 
66 Silverstein, Law’s Allure, fn.21, p.68. 
67 See Fiona de Londras, “In defence of Judicial Innovation”, in Hickey, Callihane and Gallen (eds), Judges, 
Politics and the Irish Constitution (Manchester University Press, 2017); Cornellia T. Pillard, “The Unfulfilled 
Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands”, fn.41 at 688–689. 
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in the Irish legal order is not an issue regularly debated in Irish political discourse68 or even 
(until quite recently) in the pages of Irish law review.69 Indeed, Ireland might be unusual 
amongst Anglophone jurisdictions in the degree of this consensus.70 
 Constitutional review of legislation in the Irish legal order can therefore be 
characterised as a fusion and repeated iteration of the following processes: (i) executive 
dominance in the pre-enactment review process; (ii) an executive dominance heavily 
influenced by obedience to judicial precedent; and (iii) post-enactment judicial deference to an 
idealized, but fictive picture of legislative deliberation and determination over the balancing of 
constitutional rights and interests.71 The cumulative dispersal of pre- and post-constitutional 
review involvement can be illustrated by the following figure: 
 





68 See John O’Dowd, “The Impact of the Constitution in the Deliberations of the Houses of the Oireachtas”, in 
Oran Doyle and Eoin Carolan (eds), The Irish Constitution: Governance and Values (Round Hall, 2008). 
69 See in this vein: Daly, “Reappraising judicial supremacy”, fn.25; Hickey, “Revisiting Ryan v Lennon”, fn.61; 
Daly and Hickey, The Political Theory of the Irish Constitution, fn.7. 
70 Daly, “Reappraising judicial supremacy”, fn.25, p.2. 
71 Brian Foley, “Presuming the Legislature Acts Constitutionally: Legislative Process and Constitutional Decision 
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The cumulative impact of this is that consideration of constitutional issues is characterised by 
pre-enactment executive dominance, but a dominance heavily influenced by uncritical 
adherence to judicial precedents on the substance of constitutional commitments. Given the 
Office of President is a component of the Houses of the Oireachtas, the President’s absolute 
discretion to refer a bill to the Supreme Court pursuant to Art.26 gives the legislature some 
institutional role in monitoring the constitutionality of legislation during the pre-enactment 
review process.72 However, this does little to offset the absence of any real role for the 
explicitly political components of the Oireachtas. The President’s power notwithstanding—
conspicuously absent from pre-enactment review is a substantive or structured role for the Dáil 
and Seanad in contesting and deliberating constitutional issues. It is very clear that they play 
by far the least consequential role over the pre-enactment review process.73 
 
 
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRE-ENACTMENT REVIEW 
 
Even if one accepts in principle that Parliament ought to have a greater role in debates over 
constitutional issues in Ireland, one must consider how involvement might be operationalised. 
One must also consider any difficulties or obstacles such involvement might encounter. To this 
end, the next part of this article undertakes a comparative analysis of how several other 
parliamentary systems conduct pre-enactment review. I consider Canada, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom. Based on this comparative account, Part IV attempts to distil the kinds of 
factors and trends which might inhibit or empower parliamentary involvement in pre-






72 Oran Doyle, The Constitution of Ireland, fn.53, p.76. I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for raising this 
point. 
73 Moreover, it is also worth noting Art.26 has suffered a precipitous decline in its use, a factor which has been 
linked to the increasing prominence and visibility of the AG’s advice during issues of constitutional controversy. 
I have argued alongside David Kenny that it is “possible that the Presidency may be institutionally ill-equipped 
to effectively second guess the constitutional assessment of the Office of Attorney General and its sizeable 
bureaucratic apparatus”. Kenny and Casey, “Shadow Constitutional Review”, fn.45. 
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The Canadian Minister for Justice has a statutory obligation to examine every Bill introduced 
to the House of Commons by the Government, and “to ascertain whether any of the provisions 
… are inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms”.74 The Minister has an additional duty to report any inconsistency to the House of 
Commons.75 This process is intended to encourage rigorous internal evaluation of proposed 
legislation by the executive, under subsequent scrutiny by a parliament prepared to rigorously 
evaluate bills from a rights and values perspective.76 As noted above, under the ideal-type 
account of political review offered, this dispersal of responsibility for evaluating proposals for 
rights compliance is said to help create the stage for fuller and freer parliamentary and public 
engagement and deliberation with rights and values during the law-making process. In practice, 
however, the Canadian experience of pre-enactment review has been characterised by features 
only weakly matching the values associated with pre-enactment political review. It has resulted 
in relatively minimal parliamentary engagement with constitutional issues and the emergence 
of a highly juridical and secretive form of executive review. 77 
 This has been linked to several factors. For a start, the secretive nature of the internal 
review process makes it difficult for parliament to second guess or challenge the executive’s 
determination on compatibility. Parliament is given very little insight into why there has been 
a conclusion of consistency, because the executive has never made a report of inconsistency,78 
and does not have a legal duty to report when and why it considers a proposal is consistent. 
Parliamentarians have therefore found it quite difficult to determine whether the executive’s 
assessment is objectionable or not, for example if it seems too lax or conservative.79 The present 
reporting duty undermines effective parliamentary scrutiny as the executive is not required to 
disclose the constitutional basis of its legislative agenda. These authors suggest that a 
requirement to introduce statements of compatibility and incompatibility would require the 
cabinet to engage with Parliament in a more robust manner.80 A second prominent factor linked 
to Parliament’s marginal role in the pre-enactment review process is the absence of a 
 
74 Section 4(1) of the Department of Justice Act 1985. 
75 Section 4(1) of the Department of Justice Act 1985. 
76 Hiebert, “Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role?”, fn.17. 
77 Hiebert, “New Constitutional Ideas” fn.18, (1971).  
78 Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model, fn.15, 
79 Janet L. Hiebert, “Rights-Vetting in New Zealand and Canada: Similar Idea, Different Outcomes” (2005) 1 
New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 63 at 75. 
80 James B. Kelly and Matthew A. Hennigar, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and the minister of justice: Weak-
form review within a constitutional Charter of Rights” (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 35 
at 68. 
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sufficiently well-resourced committee dedicated to constitutional issues. Hiebert offers a 
concise summary of these cumulative deficiencies: 
 
“Although the Canadian parliament has two committees that regularly evaluate the 
constitutional and legal dimensions of bills, the lack of a ministerial statement about 
the Charter implications of a bill combined with the lack of independent legal advice, 
and insufficient resources, make it difficult for these committees to fully appreciate 
whether legislation is vulnerable from a Charter perspective or, alternatively, whether 
the government has produced legislation that is constitutionally more cautious or risk 
adverse than required.”81 
 
The currently peripheral position of Parliament in the pre-enactment review process may 
change on foot of the introduction of a Bill aimed at amending the reporting duties of the 
Minister for Justice. Bill C-51, which was introduced in June 2017 and is now winding its way 
through Parliament, imposes an additional statutory duty on the executive not only to report on 
inconsistencies to Parliament, but to issue a publicly available statement outlining the key 
considerations that inform the review of a proposed Bill for consistency with the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.82 These “Charter Statements” are designed to highlight rights 
and freedoms that are potentially engaged by a Bill and to provide a brief explanation of the 
nature of any engagement, in light of the measures being proposed.83 A Statement may also 
identify potential justifications for any limits on the rights and freedoms a Bill may impose.84 
The self-described purpose of Charter Statements is to help inform public and parliamentary 
debate on a proposed Bill85 and to provide some kind of substantive reason justifying an 
assertion of compatibility. While the Minister for Justice does occasionally publish a Charter 
Statement as a matter of practice, if the Bill is enacted, publication of statements will become 
a statutory requirement.86 
 
81 Hiebert, “New Constitutional Ideas”, fn.18 (1971).  
82 http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pl/charter-charte/index.html/ [last accessed 18 January 2019]. Prior to 
2017, this appeared to be done as a matter of political practice. 
83 Footnote 82.  
84 Footnote 82. 
85 Footnote 82. 
86 Section 72 of Bill C-51 inserts s.4.2 into the Department of Justice Act, and provides that: (1) The Minister 
shall, for every Bill introduced in or presented to either House of Parliament by a minister or other representative 
of the Crown, cause to be tabled, in the House in which the Bill originates, a statement that sets out potential 
effects of the Bill on the rights and freedoms that are guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
(2) The purpose of the statement is to inform members of the Senate and the House of Commons as well as the 
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 As already discussed, another prominent benefit associated with pre-enactment is that 
it offers a way of vindicating constitutional commitments unconstrained by the limitations 
associated with judicial reasoning. The Canadian experience appears to again fall short in 
respect of how the ideal-type account ought to function. While the executive has a specified 
role over constitutional review at the pre-enactment stage, it largely accepts judicial 
interpretation of Charter commitments. Consequently, the introduction of the Charter has been 
linked to the development of a highly juridical form of constitutionalism,87 reflective of a very 
deep scepticism about whether the political branches have a legitimate role to contribute to 
constitutional judgment, other than to anticipate judicial decisions and correct invalidated 
legislation within the guidance provided by dicta.88 Canada’s embrace of pre-enactment 
political review and its acceptance of judicial supremacy over Charter interpretation has thus 
helped facilitate bureaucratic and political cultures that try to “Charterproof” proposed 
legislation. That is, attempting to anticipate how a court may rule in respect of policy, as 
opposed to engaging in constitutional interpretation from a more openly political or morally 
infused manner.89  
 Overall, pre-enactment review in Canada is largely characterised by a secret and 
confidential executive rights-vetting process, heavily shaped by legalistic interpretation of 
judicial doctrine. During this process, Parliament largely remains on the margins and lacks the 
institutional means, such as a well-resourced specialised committee, to counteract the 
dominance of government and a strong party-whip system.90 Proposed reforms might increase 
transparency and parliamentary involvement and help instantiate some of the benefits and 
objectives associated with pre-enactment review. But for now, Canadian practice offers only a 
very rough approximation of the ideal-type account. 
 
(b) New Zealand 
 
Under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (“NZBORA”), rights are protected by a mixture of 
political pre-enactment review and limited post-enactment judicial review. Political pre-
enactment review in New Zealand is embodied in s.7 of the NZBORA, which requires that the 
 
public of those potential effects.From the website of the Canadian Parliament: 
http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-51/third-reading [last accessed 18 January 2019]. 
87 Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights”, fn.10. 
88 Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights”, fn.10. 
89 Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights”, fn.10. 
90 Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role?, fn.17, p.12. 
 19 
Attorney-General advise Parliament when bills are not consistent with its provisions. Pre-
enactment review in New Zealand involves three stages. First, there is an initial executive-
based review of the compatibility of a bill with the NZBORA. Second, based on this 
assessment, the Attorney General will either certify the bill’s compatibility or outline reasons 
for its incompatibility under the reporting requirement of s.7.91 The third avenue for rights 
review comes through parliamentary scrutiny after a bill’s formal introduction to Parliament. 
 The first stage opens with an internal review amongst executive branch lawyers. A 
specialist human rights unit of the Ministry of Justice evaluates all bills for their compliance 
with the Bill of Rights. Bills originating from the Ministry of Justice itself are vetted by the 
separate Crown Law Office92 to ensure that assessment remains external in all cases.93 
Following this, the Attorney General is advised if reviewing counsel consider that a rights 
inconsistency can be discerned. The number of bills eliminated before introduction because of 
this internal process is unknown due to its confidentiality, but it has been suggested that there 
has been “presumably some, with others being amended or reworded”.94 The process for 
evaluating bills on behalf of the executive is highly legalistic and involves government lawyers 
basing their assessments on interpretation of relevant jurisprudence and on expectations of 
what courts might say.95 If the Attorney General considers there is an inconsistency between 
the proposed bill and the Bill of Rights, then he is obliged, under s,7 of the NZBORA, to issue 
a report outlining the legal basis for this conclusion. While these reports have no formal 
implications for the bill’s status, the reports—which are made publicly available—are designed 
to put Parliament on notice about rights issues for discussion and scrutiny in the remainder of 
the legislative process.96 However, even if the Attorney General concludes that a bill is 
consistent with the NZBORA, the legal basis for this determination is also made publicly 
available. Since 2003 the Government has chosen to make available the advice provided to the 
Attorney-General on all draft bills.97  
 
91 Section 7 provides: Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General shall- 
(a) in the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or 
(b) in any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill, bring to the attention of the 
House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights. 
92 Headed by the Attorney General. 
93 Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model, fn.15, p.132. 
94 Footnote 93, p.133. 
95 Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights”, fn.10. 
96 Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model, fn.15, p.133. 
97 Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model, fn.15, pp.133–134. For copies of the relevant advice see 
https://www.justice.govt.nz/justice-sector-policy/constitutional-issues-and-human-rights/bill-of-rights-
compliance-reports/advice/ [last accessed 18 January 2019]. 
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 The combination of tiers of executive review and reporting requirements help ensure 
that rights implications are taken into serious account by the executive during the drafting 
process. Moreover, the s.7 reporting requirement and Government willingness to publicly 
disclose the legal basis for its assessments also help facilitate greater transparency and 
deliberation on rights issues. This is because Parliament and the public have access to the 
substantive reasons both for the executive’s assertions of compliance and non-compliance and 
can, at least in theory, subject them to much greater contestation and debate than if the internal 
vetting process were highly confidential and secretive. 
 Despite these statutory requirements and high levels of transparency, the efficacy of 
New Zealand’s system of pre-enactment review has been subject to critique. Parliament has 
legislated in the face of a s.7 reports 90 per cent of the time, a stark figure which has led some 
to conclude that the impact of the Bill of Rights on parliamentary behaviour is relatively 
minimal. The New Zealand experience of pre-enactment review highlights that the institutional 
and political context in which a system of review operates is just as important as the formal 
structure of review.98 In this context, the relevant figures are partly explained by the fact that 
the executive usually enjoys a reliable majority such that it can invariably whip to vote in line 
with a bill, regardless of a negative s.7 report. Factors typically associated with Westminster-
style government, such as party cohesion and executive dominance, have therefore constrained 
and complicated ambitious attempts to influence how Government decides its legislative 
agenda, and how Parliament scrutinises and votes on bills.99  
 While an element of executive dominance may be an inevitable facet of Westminster-
style government, there are also institutional design features of the pre-enactment review 
process compounding the legislature’s passive role. Most conspicuously for some 
commentators is the fact that the New Zealand Parliament lacks institutional means to carve 
out and cultivate a relatively autonomous and non-partisan space to scrutinise and contest the 
rights determinations made by the executive. For example, unlike the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand lacks a specialised, non-partisan and well-resourced human rights committee. The 
absence of an independent committee with sufficient resources, access to independent legal 
advice, and a widely recognised mandate to engage in robust and non-partisan assessment of a 
bill’s rights implications has been described as a considerable weakness reducing the extent to 
 
98 Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights, fn.12, p.10. 
99 Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights, fn.12, p.10. 
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which Parliament is likely express substantive disagreement with an executive which may be 
comprised of members of the same party.100 
 In some ways, the New Zealand experience appears to generate some of the benefits 
associated with political review. The determinations of the executive following the process of 
internal legal review in respect of both compatibility and incompatibility are made publicly 
available. This structure of review is therefore quite transparent and in theory facilitative of 
greater deliberation and engagement with important rights issues amongst the political 
branches and public, as all parties can access and scrutinise the basis for the executive’s 
assessments. However, in other respects New Zealand can be considered only a rough 
approximation of the ideal-type account of political review. As in Canada, the internal 
executive review process is highly legalistic and involves government lawyers interpreting 
judicial doctrine and attempting to guess how a court might rule.101 Moreover, the largely 
marginal role of Parliament in the review process, and the fact that it rarely attempts to contest 
the executive’s willingness to legislate in the face of a s.7 report also undermines the extent to 
which it fulfils the promise of this account—premised as it is on encouraging both branches to 
think and act in a more rights-conscious way during the law-making process.  
 
(c) The United Kingdom 
 
Under s.19 of the Human Rights Act 1998, a Minister is obliged to make a statement 
accompanying every bill his department sponsors as to its rights compliance.102 The first stage 
in the pre-enactment review process involves collaboration between the sponsoring 
departments’ legal and policy advisers with legal officers in the Attorney General’s Office, 
Cabinet’s Legislation Committee (“CLC”), and Ministry of Justice.103 According to CLC 
guidelines, legal advice on the European Convention on Human Rights (the “Convention”) 
matters will come primarily from departmental legal advisers, but a department may also 
instruct external counsel, or seek an informal view on particularly tricky issues from legal 
 
100 Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model, fn.15, p.153.  
101 Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights”, fn.10. 
 
102 Section 19 provides that a minister must: “make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of the 
Bill are compatible with the Convention rights” or if he is “unable to make such a statement of compatibility the 
government nevertheless wishes to proceed with the Bill”. 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/section/19 [last accessed 18 January 2019]. 
103 The Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee are the screening body who clear any bill for inclusion 
in the government’s legislative programme. See Parliamentary Business and Legislation Secretariat, Guide to 
Making Legislation (Cabinet Office, 2017). 
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advisers in the Ministry of Justice who coordinate human rights legal issues across 
government.104 The Attorney General’s input is reserved to ensuring a memorandum is in the 
best possible shape for the legislation committee.105 Before clearing any bill for parliamentary 
scrutiny, CLC guidelines require that any bill must first be exposed to a frank assessment106 of 
human rights considerations. Previous CLC guidelines have instructed that ministers should 
only declare compatibility where “at a minimum, the balance of [legal] argument supports the 
view that the provisions are compatible”.107 This legal advice focuses on whether “it is more 
likely than not that the provisions of the Bill will stand up to challenge on Convention grounds 
before the domestic courts and the Strasbourg Court”.108 As a result, the criteria used by 
ministers to identify whether bills are compatible with rights is very heavily focused on legal 
interpretations of relevant jurisprudence.109 After this review is complete, bills are then subject 
to further review by Parliament. By the time they are introduced they usually do not merely 
include a bare statement of compatibility, but may also be accompanied by a human rights 
memorandum complete with a fuller statement of reasons why this is so.110 
 Perhaps the most significant institutional feature of the UK’s approach to pre-enactment 
scrutiny has been the establishment of a permanent Joint Committee on Human Rights. This 
Committee is charged with reporting to Parliament on the human rights implications of any 
bill.111 The Committee is widely considered to act in a way that is non-partisan and free from 
executive domination112 and is exclusively dedicated to and specialised in human rights issues. 
The Committee is also well resourced and has access to its own full-time legal advisers.113 The 
work of the Committee typically involves critically evaluating s.19 compliance statements and 
 
104 Guide to Making Legislation (London: Cabinet Office, 2017), fn.103 at para.12.7. 
105 Guide to Making Legislation (London: Cabinet Office, 2017), fn.103 at para.12.7. 
106 Guide to Making Legislation (London: Cabinet Office, 2017), fn.103 at para.12.11. 
107 Cabinet Office Constitution Secretariat, Human Rights Act 1998: Guidance for Departments (London: Home 
Office, 2000) at para.36. 
108 Human Rights Act 1998: Guidance for Departments, fn.107. 
109 Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bills of Rights”, fn.10. 
110 Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model, fn.15, p.165. 
111 Comprised of members of the Commons and House of Lords. 
112 For example, although the incumbent government consists of the Conservative party, they do not enjoy a 
majority on the Committee. The Chair of the Committee is a senior member of the leading opposition party and 
six out of 12 seats on the Committee are filled from the opposition benches. See 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-
committee/membership/ [last accessed 18 January 2019]. Kavanagh observes that, due to its membership 
composition and access to independent legal advice, the committee tends to function with a “relatively high degree 
of cross-party consensus and cooperation” and has a reputation “for being more independent than most Commons 
committees”. See Aileen Kavanagh, “Joint Committee on Human Rights: A Hybrid Breed of Constitutional 
Watchdog”, in Hunt, Hooper and Yowell (eds), Parliament and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit 
(Hart Publishing, 2015), p.118. 
113 Kavanagh, “Joint Committee on Human Rights”, fn.112. 
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explanatory memoranda issued by the executive in respecting of Convention compliance, and 
issuing reports on the rights implications of the bill for broader parliamentary and public 
review. Aileen Kavanagh notes that the work of the Committee has become a settled part of 
the UK human rights landscape, earning an excellent reputation for the quality and robustness 
of its reports.114 
 In terms of its substantive impact, the Committee has worked to robustly probe the 
evidence for the “government’s compatibility statements, inform parliament of its rights 
concerns, educate members and generally increase parliament’s engagement with human rights 
issues”.115 In recent years, it has also been observed that the Committee—given that it is not 
bound by precedent—will often express its own views on compatibility rather than merely 
attempting to rigidly predict what a court might say about the measure.116 When it does so it 
explains the difference in its view by giving explicit reasons in its reports.117 This is not to say 
that the Committee disregards existing jurisprudence when carrying out its work. The 
Committee’s access to independent expert legal advice has played a considerable role in its 
work, and the legal dimension of its work has been used as a tool of political influence.118 For 
example, Kavanagh notes how the Committee’s access to independent legal advice heightens 
its ability to point out where government lawyers may have “overlooked or underlooked the 
importance of some legal issues” and to provide strong counter-arguments to the Government’s 
legal advice which might make it more likely to consider amendments.119 
 However, because executive dominance of parliament is invariably one of the general 
structural features of Westminster-style systems, the direct impact of Committee deliberations 
on legislative outputs remains underwhelming for some commentators.120 Nonetheless, given 
that the Committee operates in a typically executive-dominated and highly partisan 
environment, commentators argue that its less tangible impact on pre-enactment rights 
deliberation and scrutiny should not be underestimated. A narrow focus on how many 
amendments Committee scrutiny has secured will not reveal gains in accountability, 
deliberation and scrutiny which are all valuable in themselves and instrumentally valuable in 
promoting greater parliamentary respect for important statutory commitments.121 In terms of 
 
114 Kavanagh, “Joint Committee on Human Rights”, fn.112, p.117. 
115 Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model, fn.15, p.193. 
116 Kavanagh, “Joint Committee on Human Rights”, fn. 112, p.127. 
117 Kavanagh, “Joint Committee on Human Right”.’ fn. 112. 
118 Kavanagh, “Joint Committee on Human Rights”, fn.112, p.130. 
119 Kavanagh, “Joint Committee on Human Rights”,. fn.112, p.129. 
120 Kavanagh, “Joint Committee on Human Rights”, fn.112, p.134. 
121 Kavanagh, “Joint Committee on Human Rights”, fn.112, p.138. 
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its less tangible impact, Kavanagh suggests that the Committee has helped ensure the executive 
now provides Parliament with more detailed information on its human rights reasoning than 
ever before, increasing the transparency of the review process for legislators and the public.122 
Additionally, Committee reports are now frequently cited and deployed as the basis for 
intervention in parliamentary debates,123 which might suggest a greater level of rights 
consciousness and engagement by parliamentarians. Some suggest the robust scrutiny of the 
Committee and increased engagement by parliamentarians with its work has heightened 
executive interest in ameliorating the likelihood of a negative Committee report in the first 
instance.124 Of course, these gains in transparency and the increased ability of Parliament to 
scrutinise executive action for consistency with Convention rights have not reconstituted the 
fundamental nature of their relationship, which remains characterised by high levels of party 
cohesion and loyalty. 
 An important observation to take from this comparative account is that the efficacy of 
pre-enactment review in promoting the benefits outlined in Part I is constrained by broader 
socio-political frameworks. This includes political party cohesiveness and the degree of 
institutional closeness between Parliament and the executive.125 That said, it is also evident that 
the institutional design of pre-enactment review plays a role, for example, whether the 
Government has a mandatory reporting duty or a duty to disclose the basis for asserting 
compliance or noncompliance. The greater the level of transparency, the easier it is for 
parliamentarians to scrutinise and debate the conclusions of the executive branch. Similarly, 
the lack of a strong committee system has been associated with the strength or weakness of 
parliamentary involvement in pre-enactment review. The presence or absence of these factors 
undoubtedly plays a role in the ability of Parliament to cultivate a robust role during pre-
enactment review. Pre-enactment review in many systems represents a rough approximation, 
or second-best instantiation of the type found in theoretical accounts. However, even if only 
amounting to a sub-optimal version of these accounts, benefits such as increased contestation, 
deliberation and transparency over political processes concerning important rights and values 
are certainly not trivial. They represent valuable benefits from which the Irish system of 
constitutional review could potentially gain. 
 
122 Kavanagh, “Joint Committee on Human Rights”, fn.112, p.139. 
123 Kavanagh, “Joint Committee on Human Rights”, fn.112, p.132. 
124 Kavanagh, “Joint Committee on Human Rights”, fn.112, p.137. 
125 See generally Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights, fn.12. 
 25 
 Part IV of this article attempts to distil the various factors which might help potential 
institutional reforms facilitate a more pronounced role for Parliament over constitutional 
review in Ireland. I tentatively suggest that the recent innovation of pre-legislative scrutiny—
along with several additional reforms—may serve as a good starting basis for any conversation 
concerning reform.  
 
IV. PRE-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY AS A ROAD-MAP TO REFORM? 
 
It has been suggested that after a draft bill is approved by cabinet it will tend to become law in 
the same form and unaltered by the Oireachtas. 126 There is a deal of enduring truth to this 
assertion insofar as its underscores the executive’s political predominance. However, the 
institutional weakness of the Oireachtas should not be caricatured.127 For example, as with 
other parliamentary systems, political parties act as a variable on executive power that can 
empower or constrain depending on whether a government commands a majority, a coalition, 
or a minority. Coalition and minority government have become frequent fixtures of Irish 
political life.128 Both scenarios can make it more difficult for the executive to leverage 
predominance over Parliament. An executive leading a coalition government may well be faced 
with the possibility of finding itself pursuing policies it would reject if it commanded a 
majority.129 In these circumstances it lacks the legislative efficacy enjoyed by majority 
government.130 Minority governments can similarly act to disempower the executive. Where a 
government commands a plurality but not a majority of seats, a moderate measure of inter-
branch competition can emerge. In this way, minority government in Ireland can resemble 
divided governments in presidential systems where different parties control the presidency and 
legislature.131 An executive in a minority government will generally be less able to pass its full 
legislative and policy agenda, and Parliament may command a greater institutional role over 
policy formulation.132 Irish minority governments are much more likely than majority 
governments to see their policy proposals defeated or modified by Parliament. Minority 
 
126 Daly and Hickey, The Political Theory of the Irish Constitution, fn.7, p.105. 
127 Eoin O’Malley, “Apex of Government”. fn.8, p.37. 
128 Doyle, The Constitution of Ireland, fn.53, pp.55–56. 
129 Richard Albert, “Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarianism”, (2009) 57 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 531 at 570. 
130 Albert, “Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarianism”, fn.129 at 573. 
131 Albert, “Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarianism”, fn.129 at 565. 
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governments are also clearly more susceptible to collapse and votes of no confidence.133 Even 
if not at immediate threat of a no confidence vote, for example, where a minority government 
is maintained by a memorandum of understanding with another opposition party—as the 
current Irish executive has been since 2015—its legislative efficacy is undoubtedly lessened.134 
 Aside from party variables, relatively recent political developments are an additional 
caveat which must accompany statements emphasising the weakness of Parliament. At least to 
the extent such statements imply that the Oireachtas as an institution has no policy input during 
or prior to the legislative process.135 Since 2011, successive governments have pioneered 
several initiatives which have bolstered the institutional power of Parliament. These include 
the introduction of secret ballot to elect the Ceann Comhairle,136 creation of a standing Business 
Committee to allocate parliamentary time on a more proportionate basis between government 
and opposition parties,137 and the introduction of the D’Hondt system to allocate chairmanship 
and membership of committees on a more proportional basis. These initiatives are all 
symbolically and practically significant to Parliament’s institutional power. The latter two 
measures dilute the ability of the government to dominate parliamentary time, underscoring 
the independence of committees, and counteracting the ability of government to exercise tight 
control over their policy and scrutiny work.138 Allied to these has been the introduction of pre-
legislative scrutiny (“PLS”) to the Oireachtas. This process involves Parliament—through its 
committees—scrutinising draft legislation of government departments and reporting its 
concerns, views and recommendations before a more final version of a bill has been drafted 
and formally introduced to the houses.139 
 Initially, PLS was largely a matter of government discretion, with 2011 amendments to 
cabinet procedure permitting ministers to publish legislation in draft format following its 
approval by Cabinet. However, in 2013 Dáil Standing Orders were amended to provide for a 
more formalised process of PLS. The relevant standing order now provides that the initiative 
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for requesting PLS is squarely in the hands of Parliament.140 If initiated, PLS can involve141 
public hearings involving the calling of department officials to explain the heads of bill; the 
invitation of written and oral submissions from a range of advocates, interest groups and 
stakeholders relevant to the bill;142 and a committee report providing judgment and 
recommendations based on issues arising during the scrutiny of the bill. A recent study of the 
impact of PLS demonstrates its efficacy as a means of bolstering parliamentary influence over 
the legislative process. The study undertook a content analysis of 50 instances of PLS, and 
identified 467 unique recommendations emerging from the Oireachtas. In 31 of these 50 cases, 
the bill under scrutiny had subsequently been published and/or enacted at the time of the 
analysis. Analysis of the bills in these 31 cases indicated that ministers accepted 146 of 350 
recommendations—an acceptance rate of 41.7 per cent. The study concluded that PLS can have 
a “very real and substantive impact on Government legislation” and serves to strengthen the 
“role of the Oireachtas in law-making.”143 
 PLS has provided Parliament with the institutional means to exercise greater 
contestatory power over policy choices, and the form of their implementation. This innovation 
has undoubted implications for the allocation of power between the executive and Parliament, 
and is a potentially solid means of strengthening Parliament’s capacity to robustly scrutinise 
government proposals. PLS gives it greater opportunity to influence policy-making through 
public analysis, critique and feedback on draft legislation.144 These institutional innovations 
are amongst the most far-ranging in the history of the state, albeit they are operating from a 
low baseline.145 That said, in terms of the division of authority and responsibility for assessing 
the compatibility of policy measures with constitutional commitments, parliamentary 
involvement remains minimal. In respect of these issues, the initial drafting and pre-enactment 
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review process remains heavily dominated by the input of cabinet, executive lawyers and 
independent private practitioners briefed by the AG’s Office. While the executive incorporates 
legal review for constitutional issues into the pre-enactment process, the process excludes 
Parliament from a substantive role in this area. PLS has not altered that reality. 
 This failure is traceable to several factors, but I focus on two of the most prominent. 
First, there is a marked lack of transparency in the pre-enactment review process carried out 
by the executive. The legal basis for executive assertions regarding a bill’s constitutionality is 
rarely (if ever) disclosed to Parliament for a second look or contestation. Second, Parliament 
lacks institutional means such as a dedicated, well-resourced and non-partisan constitutional 
committee to allow it to carve out space to review decisions concerning constitutional 
commitments. These arrangements necessarily dilute several of the normative values otherwise 
instantiated by entrusting constitutional review with both representative branches. They 
hamper capacity to engage in full, free and critical deliberation over the implications of 
legislative proposals from the perspective of constitutional commitments. Even with the 
introduction of PLS, secretive and undisclosed executive determinations of constitutionality 
remain effectively determinative of legislative opinion.146 Consequently, explicit exercises in 
constitutional interpretation by legislators still arise infrequently. 
 Based on the arguments and observations made above, PLS may be a good point at 
which to kick-start any debate over increasing parliamentary involvement with respect to 
constitutional review. Through this innovation parliamentary committees now enjoy greater 
institutional contestatory power in respect of policy formulation and its execution. This stems 
from their authority and power to scrutinise draft bills and report their recommendations to 
Government before a final version of the bill is formally introduced to Parliament. This reform 
has generally empowered Parliament to a greater degree than before. However, what is missing 
from the current framework of PLS in the context of my argument is a conscious attempt to 
carve out sufficient institutional autonomy for parliament to specifically contest and deliberate 
upon constitutional issues. Several amendments to the current PLS process could bolster 
Parliament’s role over constitutional review.  
 By comparing the pre-enactment constitutional review processes of Canada, New 
Zealand, and the UK I have distilled a few institutional features from each system which are 
better calculated to facilitate deliberation on constitutional issues by the political branches. The 
 
146 Doyle, The Constitution of Ireland, fn.53, p.94; Kenny and Casey, “Shadow Constitutional Review”, fn.45. 
 29 
first involves increasing the transparency of executive branch constitutional review. This might 
include a requirement that the executive disclose reasons why a bill is or is not compliant with 
constitutional commitments as opposed to supplying a bare assertion of compatibility. This 
might involve frequent disclosure of the underlying legal and policy basis for the executive’s 
assessment of a bill’s compliance, by making legal advice, or perhaps an abridged summary, 
available to Parliament and the public for scrutiny. As already noted, the near blanket insistence 
on non-disclosure of legal advice severely narrows the scope for parliamentary or public 
scrutiny. Ultimately, increased transparency is crucial as lack of disclosure of any detailed 
information about constitutional advice severely undermines the ability of external actors to 
assess or second-guess executive conclusions on constitutionality. This severely inhibits any 
kind of full and free debate between the branches on the interaction between policy proposals 
and constitutional commitments. If the legal basis for asserting compliance or non-compliance 
were published it would open avenues for review of controversial government policies, 
particularly those explicitly tied to contestable constitutional assessments of the AG. The recent 
Canadian innovation of introducing “Charter Statements” might provide a useful template for 
reform in the Irish context, offering a compromise between full disclosure of advice by the 
executive and blanket refusal. Such statements could highlight the constitutional rights and 
values potentially engaged by a bill and provide a brief explanation of the nature of any 
engagement, in light of the measures being proposed.147 The statement may also identify 
potential justifications for any limits on the rights a bill may impose.148 They could also identify 
legal reasons why the Government has concluded a particular measure is unconstitutional. As 
in Canada, the purpose of these statements would be to help inform public and parliamentary 
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debate on a proposed bill149 and to provide substantive reasons for justifying a declaration of 
compatibility or non-compatibility, rather than relying on bald and contestable assertions. 
 The second reform involves fostering parliamentary contestatory power against the 
executive. This attempts to counteract the general structural features of Westminster-style 
government such as political party cohesion and executive-legislative fusion. Following the 
example of the UK, this could involve promoting effective committee involvement in 
constitutional review. In the UK, this encompassed the creation of a committee that is 
dedicated, independent and sufficiently staffed and resourced to allow it to offer a rigorous 
view on executive branch assessment on rights issues. In an Irish context, this could involve 
the creation of a constitutional law committee empowered at a pre-legislative stage to scrutinise 
(i) executive proposals asserted to be compliant with constitutional commitments, as well as 
(ii) executive determinations that a proposal cannot be pursued because it is unconstitutional. 
Based on the comparative overview undertaken in Part III, the committee would ideally be 
non-partisan in its sense of mission, proportionately represent a range of political parties in the 
Oireachtas (and thus moral and political viewpoints relevant to constitutional interpretation), 
and be well resourced and staffed with its own legal advisers. It would be able to scrutinise 
determinations of the executive on constitutional issues and offer its own positions through 
issuing observations or reports. These observations might then be used as the basis for greater 
contest and debate in the Oireachtas during the legislative process. In arriving at its own 
conclusions, the committee could have regard to a wide range of sources, including the position 
of the executive and AG, its own good-faith reading of the constitution, the views of its legal 
advisers, and the submissions of witnesses whose interests or professed expertise are 
considered relevant to constitutional questions. For those hoping to promote a more meaningful 
and potent role for Parliament in the constitutional review process, combining the recent 




V. CAVEATS AND CONCLUSION 
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This article concludes by briefly highlighting some barriers which may hamper attempts at 
cultivating greater parliamentary involvement over constitutional review, notwithstanding any 
reforms. For a start, I concede that these suggestions may appear idealistic, perhaps even 
hopelessly unrealistic, given the consensus that the Irish Parliament tends not to be one which 
stands out as a strong legislature in international comparisons, despite the State’s ongoing 
period of minority government. The current experience of minority government has moved the 
constitutional order toward something approximating the tripartite separation of powers 
outlined in Arts 6, 15 and 28.150 As Doyle puts it, for the first time in the history of the State 
the Government may be forced to introduce and faithfully execute legislation with which it 
might profoundly disagree.151 This undoubtedly represents a significant shift in the 
constitutional balance of power between the executive and Parliament.152 However, even with 
these developments it may still be fanciful to envisage political actors wishing to introduce 
fundamental reforms that may add further institutional roadblocks to the achievement of policy 
objectives when in government. From the perspective of a minority government, these reforms 
may simply aggravate an already acute sense of political paralysis.153 For a government 
commanding a plurality or majority, they may be considered an unwanted hindrance to 
achieving valuable political objectives. Another important and related question is whether 
legislators would even be inclined to accrue additional responsibility in a sensitive sphere of 
activity, namely debates concerning constitutional commitments. As a matter of political 
culture politicians have long regarded these questions to be the domain of lawyers and 
judges.154 There is a risk that pre-enactment review will not promote anything close to 
meaningful moral or political deliberation about constitutional issues on the part of legislators. 
Instead, it may simply promote formulaic consideration of rights-based questions by policy-
makers seeking to “litigation-proof” legislation by focusing squarely on judicial doctrine and 
attempting to predict how a court will rule.155 
 Even if we afford greater recognition to the fact that extrajudicial constitutional 
interpretation can co-exist with judicial review,156 a third thorny question will invariably 
arise—perhaps the most fundamental. This is the interlocking question of how much deference 
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the courts should show to the political branches in formulating doctrine and evaluating the 
constitutionality of legislation, and how much deference non-judicial actors should in turn 
show the judiciary in articulating constitutional understandings and taking political actions.157 
The experience of the systems I consider appear to suggest that political cultures which 
embrace judicial review—particularly those with strong-form review—find it difficult to sever 
articulation of constitutional or statutory rights from highly legalistic analysis. Interpretation 
of rights and values tends to be understood as a technical legal exercise, the sole preserve of 
senior judges and elite lawyers versed in formal legal craft. The experience of these 
jurisdictions might suggest a broader trend; that the existence of judicial review leaves little 
scope for more open-ended political or moral input on these issues by parliamentarians. If this 
is the case, it may well be quixotic to envisage parliamentary deliberations on the 
constitutionality of bills being severed from court-mimicking in favour of reasonable 
alternative interpretation anchored on more open-ended moral and political readings of 
constitutional text. It may be equally unlikely to imagine the judiciary—which has jealously 
guarded its self-proclaimed role as guardians of the Constitution—sanctioning an explicit 
departure from judicial precedent anchored on a good-faith alternative constitutional 
understanding.158 As O’Donnell J. has pithily put it, because of this current framework there is 
a risk that any attempt to cultivate a measure of political constitutionalism through parliament 
“flirts with futility”.159  
 Simply put, it will be extremely difficult to determine in the abstract whether the kind 
of reforms I am advocating will be capable of morphing broader constitutional culture. These 
questions are fundamental, going to the heart of who we consider best placed to speak and give 
shape to our Constitution’s enduring commitments. They admit no easy answers. Regardless, 
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given the importance of the issues raised for our democracy, I am confident it remains a 
conversation eminently worth having.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
